« By Request: FISA Outrage | Main | Oh Noes! » An Existential Threat?08 Jul 2008 10:41 am Via Robert Farley, a helpful chart debunking the notion that Iran poses some kind of existential threat to the United States. It's worth avoiding nuclear proliferation in Iran because, in general, the continued spread of nuclear weapons poses serious risks for the world. But that's a far cry from saying that Iran is, as such, any kind of serious military threat. Comments (46)
It's *never* been about the actual threat of Iran. Remember, our interest in Iran only began once they nationalized their oil in the 50's, and just as with Iraq we seek to have our corporations safely pumping it. 
debunking the notion that Iran poses some kind of existential threat to the United States Strawman alert!
yes, but those guys in the desert are crazy. CRAAZZZYYYY, I tell you *parodies stereotypical Samuel L Jackson MOTHERF***IN SNAKES ON NO MOTHERF***IN PLANE overacting*
Sorry to hijack the thread Matt, but maybe you should write something about the Strange Bedfellows coalition. And get Andrew on it too, you two have a big voice.
I dunno, they have more artillery pieces than us! They could reduce our curtain walls and lay siege to our star forts!
Uh Al? I don't think strawman means what you think it means. Especially when Lieberman says that Iran is an existential threat to Israel and then when they are done with Israel, its on to us.
A small arms budget but according to the AP today a portion of it might have come from the US!
A small arms budget but according to the AP today a portion of it might have come from the US!
A small arms budget but according to the AP today a portion of it might have come from the US!
Don't you know that the litmus test for being Republican today is that you have to make a yellow stain in your undies every time somebody says "Muslim", "Islamofacist", or "Iran"? Add to the list "clash of civilizations," "Eurabia," and "Islam's bloody borders."
I thought the stain had to be brown. It's a veritable rainbow coalition in Republicans' underoos.
10-40 nuclear warheads would seem to improve Iran's military position vs. the US, particularly Iran's ability to strike at US interest regionally and in Europe. This link points out exactly why Iranian nuclear weapons would change the balance of power in a big way.
Where is Iran going to get 10-40 nuclear warheads? Indeed, where is Iran going to get one nuclear warhead? For that matter, where is Iran going to get the currently non-existent long-range missile capability that would carry this hypothetical threat as far as Europe? Really a shame that Ahmadinejad said today that he sees no chance of a war with the U.S. or Israel. Remember back in the day when you could really count on your evil villains to make unreasonable and bellicose threats?
10-40 nuclear warheads would seem to improve Iran's military position vs. the US Well, yes it would, good point. So would an alliance with Magneto and his League of Evil Mutants. The one being only slightly more likely to happen than the other.
Uh Al? I don't think strawman means what you think it means. Especially when Lieberman says that Iran is an existential threat to Israel and then when they are done with Israel, its on to us. Strawman means exactly what I think it means. Nobody is saying that Iran poses and existential threat to the United States. A dangerous threat, sure. Existential? No. (Is a nuclear Iran potentially an existential threat to Israel - sure.)
If Pakistan can obtain more than 24 nuclear weapons, I don't see why Iran obtaining more than 10 nuclear weapons is a crazy notion, especially since Iran is wealthier and more educated than Pakistan. Putting this in the 'alliance with Magneto' box isn't terribly reality based. http://www.fas.org/nuke/guide/pakistan/nuke/
"10-40 nuclear warheads would seem to improve Iran's military position vs. the US, particularly Iran's ability to strike at US interest regionally and in Europe. This link points out exactly why Iranian nuclear weapons would change the balance of power in a big way. Posted by stefan | July 8, 2008 11:56 AM" Considering they don't really have any warheads capable of hitting Israel and barely have the maximum distance capable of attacking Saudi Arabia, we don't have much to fear at this point. Add on a heavy nuclear warhead and those decreases how far a missile can travel. Think of how North Korea's Taepodong missile tests have failed years after having an active nuclear program. A sticks (sanctions) and carrots (normalization of diplomatic relations, working together on common security threats like al-Qaida and the Taliban) approach can easily prevent Iran from gathering together all of the necessary technology to make a threat in the first place.
Pakistan didn't get those nukes on their own. They got them through a partnership with the Chinese while we kind of looked the other way because Pakistan and China were allies on pushing the Soviets out of Afghanistan. China, after all, also wanted to make sure that Pakistan had nukes as a balance against India, who had a "peaceful nuclear explosion" in the 1970's under Indira Gandhi.
Reality Man: I'm not arguing that Iran will shortly have a full fledged deliverable arsenal of 10+ nuclear weapons. I'm simply claiming that Pakistani capabilities for warheads and delivery systems are a realistic expectation for end of the next decade if Iran decides to go there. This would be a major change in the military balance of power. I also, I don't see how you can claim that carrots and sanctions can "easily prevent Iran from gathering together all of the necessary technology". Hoping for watertight sanctions on technology might indeed fall into the 'alliance with Magneto' box: it's wishing for ponies. The question is what we'll get with the carrots and sanctions we can actually get in the real world.
Considering realistic technology sanctions on Iran, I find it hard to assess what Russia and China's position is here. As Reality Man pointed out, China found it in its interests to enable a Pakistani nuclear capability to balance India. To what extent would the same logic apply to China enabling a Iranian nuclear capability to balance the US? If not today, how about five years in the future? Or as something to hold over the US as a realistic possibility? How about the same thing for Russia? Given the need of China for access to Persian Gulf oil, I could see it being in Chinese interests to keep the US out of Iran, and that a nuclear Iran might be in China's best long term interest here. I'm not claiming that this is how things are going to play out, I'm just objecting to the claim that getting technology sanctions that can easily prevent Iran from getting to Pakistani levels of nuclear capabilities is easy and in the obvious interest of all relevant parties.
Thinking about it, I'd say China's objective interest in balancing the US through a nuclear Iran is probably more important than China's interest in balancing India through a nuclear Pakistan.
"I'm not arguing that Iran will shortly have a full fledged deliverable arsenal of 10+ nuclear weapons. I'm simply claiming that Pakistani capabilities for warheads and delivery systems are a realistic expectation for end of the next decade if Iran decides to go there. This would be a major change in the military balance of power." Unless Russia is willing to be Iran's patron, it just is unlikely they will pass all of the technological barriers necessary to have 10+ nuclear-armed ICBMs capable of hitting Israel and Europe. Pakistan needed a nuclear-armed patron for over a decade with the US intentionally ignoring that partnership in order to get nukes. It just is unlikely Pakistan could have been able to make nukes on their own in less than 3 decades, especially considering how unstable Pakistan has always been. "I also, I don't see how you can claim that carrots and sanctions can "easily prevent Iran from gathering together all of the necessary technology". Hoping for watertight sanctions on technology might indeed fall into the 'alliance with Magneto' box: it's wishing for ponies. The question is what we'll get with the carrots and sanctions we can actually get in the real world. Posted by stefan | July 8, 2008 12:44 PM" They don't even have to be anywhere near watertight. The Iraqi Oil for Food program was notoriously corrupt, yet the sanctions on Iraq still prevented it from acquiring WMD's. The regime is unpopular and living on borrowed time. Its technological base is lacking due to the governing ideology. What tests they did do when they did have a program seemed to cause more property damage to test sites than bringing actual progress. Unless one of the nuclear states out there is willing to be its patron and have us ignore that relationship while completely fooling the CIA and all of our allies' intelligence services on the nature of that relationship, Iran is going to have an extremely tough time getting useful nuclear missiles that can threaten anybody. The US, France, the UK, Israel and India have no interest in being Iran's nuclear patron. Russia doesn't need Iranian oil. China needs the oil, but they are worried about regional instability, especially given the tendency for the Turkic Muslim province of Xinjiang in the west to go through periods of violent separatist activity. North Korea is moving towards disarming and knows we would rain Armageddon down on them if they helped Iran get nukes. Pakistan doesn't want to have another nuclear state in the territory, especially one that cannot be counted on to be a reliable ally.
"Thinking about it, I'd say China's objective interest in balancing the US through a nuclear Iran is probably more important than China's interest in balancing India through a nuclear Pakistan. Posted by stefan | July 8, 2008 1:00 PM" Just because the US becomes less powerful in a region doesn't mean that's good for China. China cares more about holding onto Xinjiang than potential small power gains in a single region. Add in the fact that Iran isn't reliable as an ally and can easily turn anti-China on the Xinjiang issue, the instability a nuclear arms race would bring to the region (if Iran gets nukes from China, the US will probably just arm Saudi Arabia and/or Turkey, making China not actually much more powerful in the region than before) and so on and aiding the Iranian nuclear program doesn't look like a sure bet for China. China has gone through great pains to prove to other developing and developed countries it is no longer a revolutionary power. Aiding the Iranian nuclear program would cut against that strongly, especially considering that states like Turkey, Saudi Arabia and Egypt hate Iran. Even if Iran got nukes, it's not clear Iran would play ball with China afterwards, meaning China would have just shot itself in the foot.
Reality Man: first, thanks for the quality of your comments. 1) I don't see how you can put the sanction regime on Iraq 1991-2003 into the same category as the sanction regime that could be obtained against Iran today. 2) Concern about separatist sentiment in Muslim areas of China didn't prevent China from helping Pakistan's nuclear program, and I don't see why it should prevent China helping Iran. I don't know of any Iranian attempts to destabilize Muslim areas of China. Close China-Iran relations would keep things this way. Do you have any evidence Iran supporting separatism in China is a Chinese concern and that China does not see close Iran-Chinese relations the best way of dealing any separatist problems?
Reality Man writes: 'China cares more about holding onto Xinjiang than potential small power gains in a single region.' I'd argue that containing US power in the Persian Gulf isn't 'a small power gain in a single region' for China. Access to oil, both positive access to oil for China and the possibility that US access will be put at risk, is a strategic interest of first importance for China. World oil reserves are becoming increasingly concentrated in the Persian Gulf and oil is, for a good time to come, an essential industrial commodity. For China the Persian is no more a side show than it is for the US. The US cares about oil and Israel, and China cares about oil and Xinjiang. Except for the US these two interests currently conflict, and for China they don't.
"1) I don't see how you can put the sanction regime on Iraq 1991-2003 into the same category as the sanction regime that could be obtained against Iran today." To a certain extent yes, but that is because the sanctions against Iraq went beyond what was necessary to keep Iraq WMD-free. Sanctions against Iran are more fine-grained. All that is really necessary is keeping out nuclear technology, ICBM components and dual-use technology. Even if one or two things get through, it likely won't be enough to build an entire nuclear arsenal. "2) Concern about separatist sentiment in Muslim areas of China didn't prevent China from helping Pakistan's nuclear program, and I don't see why it should prevent China helping Iran. I don't know of any Iranian attempts to destabilize Muslim areas of China. Close China-Iran relations would keep things this way. Do you have any evidence Iran supporting separatism in China is a Chinese concern and that China does not see close Iran-Chinese relations the best way of dealing any separatist problems? Posted by stefan | July 8, 2008 1:22 PM" They supported the Pakistani nuclear program because from their point of view China had no choice. India had nukes (and China had fought a war with India in 1962 and had unresolved border issues that are now on the road to being resolved) and the Soviet Union, their greatest enemy, had invaded Afghanistan. The US is nowhere near the enemy to China that the Soviets were in 1979. Instead, we are major trading partners. Pakistan was dependent on China as the nearest thing it has had to a reliable ally, so they tried not to piss off China and didn't even really say anything when China didn't help Pakistan in the 1972 war with India. However, Pakistan's dependency on China is very much based on its perpetual weakness vis-a-vis India, which became more pronounced when India split Pakistan in half in 1972 and soon afterwards tested nuclear devices. Since Iraq is now an Iranian ally, it has no real need to be dependent on China and thus China has no insurance policy that Iran can be as reliable as Pakistan. While I don't know if Iran has an history of supporting Uyghur separatists, Iran's power would increase vis-a-vis China that it would be easier to do so if Iran so chose. In addition, Iran having nukes would likely spur other Central Asian and Middle Eastern countries to have nukes, thus reducing China's power vis-a-vis the Muslim countries to its West. China just has no way to trust Iran as a reliable ally. They don't really share a close cultural connection. China has no real history of animosity towards Egypt (one of the few places China kept an ambassador during the Cultural Revolution) or Saudi Arabia, while Iran does. Iran having nukes would likely lead to Saudi Arabia, Turkey and Egypt wanting nukes as well. If it became known that Iran got nukes because of China, those nuclear programs would likely become anti-Chinese nuclear programs. China would also be risking its access to Saudi oil. By arming Pakistan, China only risked making relations worse with India and the Soviet Union, both of whom already saw China as an enemy or very real potential enemy. Arming Iran risks alienating the US (a major trading partner and the source for much of China's foreign currency reserves), Saudi Arabia, Turkey, Egypt, Pakistan, India (relations with India are becoming better and India is becoming a more important trading partner), every country in Central Asia and the EU (another major trading partner). There is also the chance that arming Shi'ite Iran would alienated every Sunni nation in the world. China has just too much to lose by arming Iran and little to gain. Not only that, but China has no way of ensuring the Iranian regime stays in power. They know that the mullahs are unpopular with the population at large and is in real danger of collapsing in a crisis. If that regime fell while Iran had nukes, China would have no real way to control that situation. They wouldn't be able to control who would replace the mullahs and get their hands on the nukes. If those who got their hands on the nukes saw themselves as revolutionaries, either democratic or Islamic, then China could become a target. Either such group would possibly see it as their moral duty to help free the Uyghurs from Chinese rule.
"I'd argue that containing US power in the Persian Gulf isn't 'a small power gain in a single region' for China. Access to oil, both positive access to oil for China and the possibility that US access will be put at risk, is a strategic interest of first importance for China. World oil reserves are becoming increasingly concentrated in the Persian Gulf and oil is, for a good time to come, an essential industrial commodity. For China the Persian is no more a side show than it is for the US. The US cares about oil and Israel, and China cares about oil and Xinjiang. Except for the US these two interests currently conflict, and for China they don't. Posted by stefan | July 8, 2008 1:31 PM" Except that it is not clear that China would actually gain power doing this in the first place. Reducing American power in the region via Iran threatens reducing regional stability as well. Arming a country with nukes is no small thing. The Chinese diplomatic corps is extremely reluctant to take huge risks these days without knowing ahead of time what the real payoff is. They also value their relationship with the US so much that they clamp down on anti-American protests and limit criticism of Bush in the press during times of tension.
viz. Chinese support for Pakistan's nuclearization, it seems the timing of China's assessment of the Soviet/Russian or Indian threats is important. For instance, if you follow http://www.fas.org/nuke/guide/pakistan/nuke/, it seems that China provided critical assistance after Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan and the collapse of the Soviet Union. I don't think you can seriously argue that containing a Russian military threat by creating a nuclear Pakistan was an important Chinese motivation in the early 1990s. Similarly, I don't think India's military posture on the border to China is a realistic motivation for providing this assistance (Indian military efforts are almost fully devoted to preparing for war with Pakistan). To the extent I see a Chinese motivation for helping Pakistan, it is due to a) pecuniary motives, both of China and of military enterprises, as well as just a cooperative history between different Chinese and Pakistani groups, b) maintaining and building the reputation as a reliable and useful ally who can play in the big leagues, c) maintaining parity with the US (and less, so Russia, given Russian decline at the time) in China's importance to India. The point being that it is false to claim that 'from their point of view China had no choice.' They did have a choice and they made the choice to help Pakistan obtain nuclear capabilities. They could have chosen otherwise and they didn't. Ex post things easily can look more predetermined than they were. If China provides Iran with nuclear technology it will be similarly easy to write in 20 years that 'from their point of view China had no choice.'
"Except that it is not clear that China would actually gain power doing this in the first place. Reducing American power in the region via Iran threatens reducing regional stability as well. Arming a country with nukes is no small thing. The Chinese diplomatic corps is extremely reluctant to take huge risks these days without knowing ahead of time what the real payoff is." But the same argument applied to China arming Pakistan, and China did arm Pakistan. And I'd be surprised if the Chinese diplomatic corps is the decision maker here. "They also value their relationship with the US so much that they clamp down on anti-American protests and limit criticism of Bush in the press during times of tension." I don't see how the occasional Chinese censorship of anti-Bush voices should suggest that China would forego protecting its access to Middle East oil for fear of offending the US. US-Chinese relations would survive a nuclear Iran and they might even improve. I don't think you can suppose the Chinese will assess the impact of a nuclear Iran on the US attitude towards China the way you do.
This myopic focus on Magneto is ignoring the far more pressing risk that Lex Luthor and Brainiac will decide to assist the Iranians with their nuclear program!
It's not a "chart." It's a table.
C'mon, guys. You're not even trying re "stefan's" comments. What's idiotic about them is not whether Iran can develop 10-40 nuclear warheads. Even if you assume that they can, you then must make the assumption that they will be the first country to use them since the United States in 1945. Given the certain annihilation of their country that would result from such an act, it is inconceivable to a rational person that Iran's ability to develop a nuclear capability would do anything more than prevent them being attacked by a superpower which has decided that military force is the first weapon in its geopolitical aresenal, and has decided that it no longer needs the approval of the international community to go to war even when it's own interests are not under direct threat. stefan's an articulate bedwetter, but a bedwetter nonetheless.
Why the name calling brewmn? I cannot even tell where we disagree yet --- couldn't you let me know where you think we disagree first? So far I only see you agreeing with me.
"viz. Chinese support for Pakistan's nuclearization, it seems the timing of China's assessment of the Soviet/Russian or Indian threats is important. For instance, if you follow http://www.fas.org/nuke/guide/pakistan/nuke/, it seems that China provided critical assistance after Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan and the collapse of the Soviet Union. I don't think you can seriously argue that containing a Russian military threat by creating a nuclear Pakistan was an important Chinese motivation in the early 1990s." By the early 1990's, Pakistan pretty much had nuclear weapons. They just hadn't tested them publicly in the manner they did in the late 1990's as a reaction to India's tests. By that point, China's motivations are pretty much moot because Pakistan's nukes were a reality. The institutional inertia in that direction had already been set in the 1970's and 1980's and it hard to stop it after decades. "Similarly, I don't think India's military posture on the border to China is a realistic motivation for providing this assistance (Indian military efforts are almost fully devoted to preparing for war with Pakistan)." India cited the threat posed by China as the motivation behind their 1990's nuclear tests. While India hasn't had any real plans to invade China since 1962 (in part because going over the Himalayas would be silly), India's military has long considered China a threat. The fear of a Chinese invasion was for decades a staple of Bollywood movies. Numerous Indian military white papers talked up the threat (one general even wrote a novel in which India needed the hand of god to intervene to beat back a Chinese invasion). You are grossly underscoring how deep distrust has long been between China and India since 1962. After all, the shock of that initial war is partly credited with having such an adverse effect on Nehru's health that many believe it is partly why he died soon afterwards. In addition, until recently China took the Pakistani side on the Kashmir issue to ensure its control of Aksai Chin, which India has long claimed since the 1962 war. By keeping Pakistan on par in terms of military power with India, India thus has no real chance to invade China to reclaim Aksai Chin because then they would have to take on Pakistan as well. Once India had an active and likely potentially successful nuclear weapons program and Pakistan was split in half, the only way to ensure military parity with India was by ensuring Pakistan had nukes as well. "But the same argument applied to China arming Pakistan, and China did arm Pakistan. And I'd be surprised if the Chinese diplomatic corps is the decision maker here." The decision makers in the near term are Hu and Wen, who tend to listen a lot to the diplomatic corps. In fact, part of the reason for censorship of discussions in the press of nationalist demagoguery on the US, Japan and Taiwan are to weaken the hand of hawks in the PLA. After the PLA tested their anti-satellite technology with the center's knowledge, Hu and Wen have been clamping down on the PLA's decision making freedom. "If China provides Iran with nuclear technology it will be similarly easy to write in 20 years that 'from their point of view China had no choice.' Posted by stefan | July 8, 2008 2:07 PM" Except that Iran would never be in a relationship of dependency with China that Pakistan would be. This changes the calculus dramatically. China could trust Pakistan a lot more because China knew they were pretty much the only game in town in the neighborhood. Pakistan couldn't turn to India and the Soviet Union, after all, for protection against India and the Soviet Union. The biggest military threat to Iran in the area is Israel. However, for China to arm Iran vis-a-vis Israel would be seen by the US as a threat to a major ally. That would dramatically harm Sino-American relations, would inflame American public opinion and would also directly insert China into Middle Eastern problems they can easily avoid. "US-Chinese relations would survive a nuclear Iran and they might even improve. I don't think you can suppose the Chinese will assess the impact of a nuclear Iran on the US attitude towards China the way you do. Posted by stefan | July 8, 2008 2:18 PM" The Chinese bureaucracy does study things like American public opinion. They know that doing things that inflame China hawks' positions to become more popular with the American public In addition, you haven't really shown any real benefits China would get from arming Iran. They might get Iranian oil, but they can get that without nukes. At the same time, cutting off their supply to Saudi oil would be suicide. For China's risk-adverse leadership to be willing to supply Iran with nuclear weapons technology, they would have to be guaranteed that Saudi Arabia would not pursue nuclear weapons in return and that they would not cut off Chinese supply to Saudi oil - or oil from any other Sunni Muslim oil exporting state. Since Saudi Arabia would never guarantee China that it would never pursue nuclear weapons or cut off the supply of oil if China helped arm what Saudi Arabia sees as a hostile regime, China would not be guaranteed a steady supply of oil. China also is dependent on Saudi Arabia for supplying their oil for their strategic oil reserve and have been trying to get Saudi Arabia to build more refineries on the Chinese coast. They have much to lose by pissing off Saudi Arabia. As such, the very act meant to ensure steady access to oil - arming Iran - could easily end up risking easy access to oil. Anything that interrupts the steady access of oil to China harms Chinese economic growth. Since a nuclear arms race could be destabilizing to the region, arming Iran could interrupt the flow of oil. The CCP fears that if economic growth significantly slow, they could be overthrown. After all, the CCP has had to depend on economic growth and domestic stability as the reason the party is the sole authority in China now that no one takes communism seriously. That is why China has been very reluctant to do things like significantly cut fuel subsidies or raise oil prices. These risks are very obvious from the outset and the gains are far from definite, so no one would likely want to move in that direction. In addition, China's program with Pakistan was very dependent on US acceptance of that program. The US would not accept China arming Iran. Last of all, China has spent the past few years trying to convince much of the world that it accepts the role of international organizations. Overriding those diplomatic gains by breaking its responsibilities on non-proliferation treaties would undermine those efforts, while also likely inflaming public opinion in countries where those efforts have been targeted, such as Sunni Indonesia, a key ASEAN member. In summation, China didn't have much to lose by pissing off the Soviet Union and India by arming Pakistan and didn't risk pissing off the US or Europe in doing so. By arming Iran, China would risk pissing off the US, the EU, India, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Turkey, Egypt, Israel and the entire Sunni world. The strategic calculus for arming Pakistan back then vs. arming Iran today is just a lot different from China's perspective.
But the same argument applied to China arming Pakistan, and China did arm Pakistan. And I'd be surprised if the Chinese diplomatic corps is the decision maker here. Maybe this is partly true, however, instability in the Middle East is American's fault. We helped Israel get nukes. Because of this Saudi Arabia talked us into helping Pakistan get nuclear technology. And then Pakistan shopped it around and helped out Iran. Iran won't give it up and now the Gulf states are scared shitless. Egypt, Saudi Arabia and all the little emirates and fiedfoms will join in on the coming arms race. War with Iran would be a disaster, but still we're pretty much screwed, especially when a "non-state" actor gets a hold of a nuke.
Reality Man, thanks for keeping up the discussion. I may need to fold soon due to time constraints and my lack of knowledge about Chinese foreign relations in the 70s and 80s with the USSR in the context of India and Pakistan. If you have actual knowledge, not just superficial impressions/surmise, of Chinese thinking today and in the 1980s on providing nuclear assistance to Pakistan and Iran I'd be quite interested. In particular: 1) how did Chinese-Pakistan nuclear cooperation come to be? What was the political and organizational context? How does this compare to Chinese relations with Iran today? I'm not thinking so much in terms of geo-politics, but in terms of who is doing what on the ground, i.e. which people/organization are talking and trading with each other. To the extent that China isn't where it was in Pakistan in 1983 today, how fast could it get there? 2) Does anybody have a sense where Chinese thought on these matters is from talking to Chinese who are actual in the loop here? Who would be in the loop? And what are they saying? It might be hard to get a sense of what actual policy here is, but do national security people think of significant Chinese nuclear cooperation with Iran as 'crazy', or something that it potentially on the table? I don't care about surmise here, but actual credible sources. I know, a tall order. On your specific points: 1) I find it odd that you suggest that India's trauma from the 1962 war and its lack of credible offensive military planning against China since then is a reason for China to be motivated by this feeble Indian military threat. Again, all offensive Indian military planning I'm aware of seems directed at Pakistan. Which suggest to me that the motivation for Chinese nuclear support for Pakistan is the prevent a successful Indian war against Pakistan, which would a) take out a Chinese ally without China being able to do much about it, b) relieve India of its need to focus on Pakistan, and freeing up India to focus on China. Similarly, I could see a Chinese motivation to preserve Iranian freedom of action vs. the US, and a nuclear Iran is one way of doing so. Conventional military support would be much less effective and diplomatically most likely more costly. 2) I think you put too much weight on China not being willing to piss off a long list of countries. It is just not clear to me a) how pissed off these countries would be by a nuclear Iran (it would depend on what Iran does), b) if they would impose costs on China. I don't see the EU countries imposing costs on China after Iran goes nuclear, and the costs the EU would impose in the lead up for a covert Chinese program to aid Iran would be low. So in the end I think this also depends on how China assesses the Iranian regime and its future evolution. Which is why Chinese aid to Pakistan make such an impression on my --- I just cannot see how one can assess the Pakistani state as functional and stable. I'd rate Iran today higher on that scale than Pakistan any time since its creation. I think the best call here would simply be that China today is different entity than when it aided Pakistan, much more a status quo power with better relations and more entangled with the US. So it comes back to trying to ascertain what the relevant powers in China actually think (not what we surmise they think). Either aiding or not aiding Iran are plausible without knowing more.
Lieberman doesn't think people know what "existential" means, here. I don't think HE knows what it means. I think he means "A nuclear Iran would fill me with existential dread." Anybody who talks about existential threats to Israel means this. Even if Tel Aviv were completely destroyed, there would still be an Israel. Palestine, on the other hand, faces an existential threat. Actually, they faced one, and they lost. Israel said, "We don't want there to be a state of Palestine," so they conquered it militarily. With the help of the US, they succeeded in making there not be such a state.
An irrelevant comparison, although it does expose the lie that Iran is some kind of regional military threat. They aren't. They do, however, underestimate the coastal navy Iran runs - it's closer to 1,000 small boats. It's not the boats per se, it's the hardware they can carry that matters. And the number of them if Iran uses swarm tactics. Also, note those artillery units - parity. Iran can drop some heavy firepower down on a concentrated point if they have to. In any event, all this is irrelevant since Iran will use 4th Gen War guerrilla and asymmetrical warfare against any US attack - and that will be effective. As someone wrote recently, in 4th Gen War, the war is not over until the guerrillas win. It's that simple. BTW Stefan's arguments are bullshit. It's extremely unlikely that Iran will ever bother to have nuclear weapons - unless the US attack causes Ayatollah Khamenei or some future Ayatollah to change his mind about that. And even then, even 10-50 nukes would be irrelevant to the balance of power in the Middle East, since Iran would be unable to use them except defensively without incurring a major US retaliation which would essential "obliterate" Iran as Hillary Clinton threatened. As I've repeatedly said, the ONLY reason Iran would want nukes at all is the ability to take US/Israeli regime change in Iran off the table. And I think it's become clear that Iran doesn't think regime change is even feasible for the US at this point, despite any war the US or Israel might want to start. That's why they stopped their nuclear weapons DATABASE program (as opposed to any "development" program) back in 2003. They just don't need them. They couldn't deliver them effectively against the US anyway - so why bother? And a nuclear attack on Israel would result in the US destroying Iran. Again, why bother? They can defeat the US and Israel using asymmetrical and 4th Gen War strategies. In any event, none of this has anything whatever to do with Iran having nukes just as Iraq had nothing whatever to do with "WMDs". That's all bullshit for public consumption. The real purpose of the threats against Iran is to seize the oil fields in Khuzestan and make war profits and assist Israel in dominating the ME - depending on whose group you're in - the oil companies, the military-industrial complex, the neocons, and/or the Zionist freaks. Anybody taking this Iran nuclear weapons crap seriously simply is clueless.
Hack writes: "Again, why bother [with nuclear weapons]? [Iran] can defeat the US and Israel using asymmetrical and 4th Gen War strategies. ... in 4th Gen War, the war is not over until the guerrillas win." Any Iranian policy maker who would chose to wage a 4th Gen War on Iranian territory in preference to deterring the US using nuclear weapons has very very odd priorities. 4th Gen war, like all guerrilla war is, if successful, extremely costly to the subject population. Obviously, it could be that the Iranian leadership is crazy and chooses to go for some new fangled 4th generation war theory by choice and not by necessity, say because it doesn't care about casualties, but it strikes me a very bizarre view. Nations who can afford it choose deterrence and forward defense (i.e. fighting on the other side's territory). You need to argue that Iran by using 4th generation warfare can deter the US and Israel with sufficient assurance that nuclear weapons become unattractive. US capabilities suggest to me that Iran will be unable to do this. Your concern about 'oil companies, the military-industrial complex, the neocons, and/or the Zionist freaks' suggests you aren't convinced the US will ultimately be deterred from the 'real purpose of the threats against Iran is to seize the oil fields in Khuzestan and make war profits' by 4th gen warfare either. Iran could go the non-nuclear 4th gen war route as a way of appeasing the US's concerns about nuclear weapons, but it ought to support this policy diplomatically. Not that this is necessarily impossible with a new administration in 2009.
On a related note, I was flabbergasted today to run across a mass media story which [gasp] allowed that Ahmadinejad maybe had been misquoted on the "wiped off the map" thing: http://www.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,1820899,00.html?xid=feed-rss-netzero The story carefully equivocates, of course, but it's remarkable that they mentioned the alternate translation at all.
Hack writes: "As I've repeatedly said, the ONLY reason Iran would want nukes at all is the ability to take US/Israeli regime change in Iran off the table." and "The real purpose of the threats against Iran is to seize the oil fields in Khuzestan and make war profits and assist Israel in dominating the ME - depending on whose group you're in - the oil companies, the military-industrial complex, the neocons, and/or the Zionist freaks." It strikes me that, if there is really a threat to 'seize the oil fields in Khuzestan' that Iran without nuclear weapons would need to defeat via longlasting 4th generation war at very high costs, both in terms of death and suffering and less material cultural costs of fighting a bloody war on one's own territory, then Iran might just want to deter the US with nuclear weapons from doing so. Or are you claiming that nuclear weapons would not deter the US from seizeing these oil fields, but the possible prospect of 4th generation war would? And I'm not asking what you'd be deterred by, but what you think the US leadership would be deterred by, given their strategic culture.
Stefan doesn't realize that 1) Iran has no nuclear option against US attack and can't have for several years at an absolute minimum even if they started developing nukes TODAY; and 2) Iran fought a war with Iraq in which it lost a million people. Their opinion of what counts as "costly" is considerably different than Stefan's. Also, keep in mind that Iran knows damn well that if the US attacks it, the goal is regime change. And they will pay any price to avoid that. And the only option they have against the US military is 4th Gen war because their conventional military cannot fight the US military and win. It's that simple. And I said nothing about "deterring the US". Iran knows perfectly well the only weapon it has to conceivably "deter the US" is the oil price. And that means nothing to the oil companies, the military-industrial complex, the Israelis and Dick Cheney. So if Iran actually believes its recent rhetoric that the US and Israel CAN'T attack Iran, it's very wrong. But then, there's no shortage of being wrong about these issues on both sides. Latest news: the US Navy is pulling its aircraft carrier out of the Persian Gulf into the Gulf of Oman, ostensibly to concentrate air power on Afghanistan. This could also be the first sign of an impending attack on Iran, since the US Navy does NOT want its carriers in the Persian Gulf - hemmed in by the very difficult to defend Straits of Hormuz - in the event of airstrikes on Iran. I believe it was Colonel Sam Gardiner who wrote a couple years ago that the first sign of an Iran war would be the Navy pulling its fleet OUT of the Persian Gulf.
Hack writes: "Stefan doesn't realize that 1) Iran has no nuclear option against US attack and can't have for several years at an absolute minimum even if they started developing nukes TODAY; and 2) Iran fought a war with Iraq in which it lost a million people." I am aware of both points. On your point 1) I wrote earlier that "I'm not arguing that Iran will shortly have a full fledged deliverable arsenal of 10+ nuclear weapons. I'm simply claiming that Pakistani capabilities for warheads and delivery systems are a realistic expectation for end of the next decade if Iran decides to go there. This would be a major change in the military balance of power." On point 2), I am aware of Iranian casualties in the 1980s, though I would like to know more about how this history affects Iranian strategic culture today. In general I'd suggest that countries who can afford it chose deterrence and forward defense strategies, not long guerrilla war strategies, which are always fall backs or plans that nobody believes will be implemented. The only exception I can think of is by some standards Switzerland, but they've not fought a costly war in a while. The fact that one's history forced one into a high casualty war where pain and suffering had to be glorified doesn't mean that the same country will opt to go that route again if a lower cost option shows up. Hack writes: "Also, keep in mind that Iran knows damn well that if the US attacks it, the goal is regime change. And they will pay any price to avoid that. And the only option they have against the US military is 4th Gen war because their conventional military cannot fight the US military and win." You seem to be by fiat ruling out options here. First, you are claiming that the US could not adopt goals short of regime change in Iran, even though you previously yourself identified one such goal, i.e. 'seize the oil fields in Khuzestan.'. Furthermore, the US has pursued military coercion with goals below regime change again Iran in the past with support of Iraq and small scale naval warfare. The costs of this sub-regime change military coercion were quite asymmetrical. Secondly, even if I grant you that 4th Gen war would prevent the US from imposing the regime of its will, it might nevertheless be unable to prevent the demise of the current regime. Iran could 'fight the US and win' with assurance only if 'winning' means that the US looses in the end. This seems like a very US centric view of the world. Hack writes; "And I said nothing about "deterring the US". Iran knows perfectly well the only weapon it has to conceivably "deter the US" is the oil price. And that means nothing to the oil companies, the military-industrial complex, the Israelis and Dick Cheney. So if Iran actually believes its recent rhetoric that the US and Israel CAN'T attack Iran, it's very wrong." This seems very confused. Yes, your failure to consider Iranian desires to deter the US is at the heart of our disagreement. You are both claiming that there is a real risk of US war against Iran, despite Iran's current deterrent by disruption of oil markets and the follow on guerrilla war that the US will loose, and then dismiss the notion that Iran might welcome some minimal nuclear deterrence in this situation. This dismissal --- 'the ONLY reason Iran would want nukes at all is the ability to take US/Israeli regime change in Iran off the table' -- seems based on the notion that 'everybody knows that extended deterrence doesn't work'. But here is the problem: a) not everybody knows that extended deterrence doesn't work, at least at the margin (indeed, I don't think the decision to size Iranian oil field would go off the same way in the US if Iran had 20+ nuclear weapons), b) Iran might just want to take regime change off the table. Your argument seems to boil down to 'Iran is likely to be attacked, millions of Iranians will die, but this is fine with Iran since they have a culture that values sacrifice and death.' And moreover, and I think this is your main point, going this way would show up the US and the futility of US military action. Accepting the utility of nuclear deterrence to Iran, on the other hand, would serve to suggest the utility of US nuclear weapons. I do agree that the US-Iran conflict and what people learn from it will shape US and world strategic culture (and much beyond that), and it's good to keep this in mind. To the extent that you do so I hope you don't overstate Iran's willingness (as opposed to ability) to suffer.
Shorter Hack: 1) "Iran knows damn well that if the US attacks it, the goal is regime change." -> "It's extremely unlikely that Iran will ever bother to have nuclear weapons"
Shorter improved Hack 2: 1) "Iran knows damn well that if the US attacks it, the goal is regime change." -> "It's extremely unlikely that Iran will ever bother to have nuclear weapons" since Iran recently "fought a war with Iraq in which it lost a million people." The argument that Iran can be trusted not to obtain nuclear weapons since it is run by a bunch of crazy religious millenialists who don't mind having millions of Iranians killed -- that's a feature, not a bug for them! -- strikes me about as credible than the view that a nuclear Iran would necessarily attack Israel since it is run by a bunch of crazy religious millenialists who don't mind having millions of Iranians killed. Maybe Hack just sees the (not necessarily religious) transformative glory of 4th Gen warfare and doesn't want that path of history cut short by a nuclear Iran. But that is not something I'd expect Iran would want to send another generation to die for.
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Heads in the Sand
C'mon Matt. Don't you know that the litmus test for being Republican today is that you have to make a yellow stain in your undies every time somebody says "Muslim", "Islamofacist", or "Iran"?
Posted by LFC | July 8, 2008 10:59 AM